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CASE NOTES
NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT INTERMEDIATE
COPYING OF OBJECT CODE IS FAIR USE
Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2D 1561
(9th Cir. 1992).
Ronald A. Peterst
INTRODUCTION
In a case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
reverse engineering is fair use if it is the only way to gain access to
the unprotected functional elements of a program's object code and
there is a reasonable purpose behind such access.
FACTS
Sega manufactures and sells video game systems, including the
Genesis console and game cartridges. Accolade manufactures
software game cartridges that are compatible with the Genesis con-
sole. In order to gain this compatibility Accolade "reverse engi-
neered" Sega's programs. Accolade "disassembled" or
"decompiled" Sega's object code, downloaded it to a PC and trans-
lated it to human readable source code. Other software manufac-
turers were also producing game cartridges compatible with Sega's
Genesis Console, however they had entered into licensing agree-
ments with Sega and were paying for the privilege. Sega sued Acco-
lade. The district court ruled in favor of Sega, stating that Accolade
could have gained access to the functional elements of compatibility
by some other means,' and granted Sega's request for injunctive
relief.2
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1. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F.Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
2. The District Court enjoined Accolade from (1) disassembling Sega's copyrighted
object code; (2) using or modifying Sega's copyrighted code; (3) developing, manufacturing,
distributing or selling Genesis-compatible games that were created in whole or in part by
means that included disassembly; and (4) manufacturing, distributing or selling any Genesis-
compatible game that prompts the Sega Message. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1565.
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Accolade raised four arguments in support of its position.3
First, Accolade argued that intermediate copying does not consti-
tute infringement under section 106 of the Copyright Act unless the
final copy is "substantially similar" to the work being copied.4 Sec-
ond, Accolade argued that decompiling or disassembling object
code in order to gain access to the functional requirements for com-
patibility is lawful under section 102(b) of the Act, which does not
extend copyright protection to such functional elements.- Third,
Accolade argued that disassembly is authorized by section 117 of
the Act, because it permits the lawful owner of the copy of a com-
puter program to load (copy) the program into a computer's mem-
ory.6 Lastly, Accolade argued that its copying of the object code in
order to gain access to the functional elements contained in the code
is a fair use which is privileged by section 107 of the Act.7 The
court was quick to point out that Accolade's first three arguments
were without merit, stating that Accolade's act of copying of the
object code was in fact infringement. However, as to Accolade's
fourth argument, the court concluded:
based on the policies underlying the Copyright Act that disas-
sembly of copyrighted object code is, as a matter of law, a fair
use of a copyrighted work if such disassembly provides the only
means of access to those elements of the code that are not pro-
tected by copyright and the copier has a legitimate reason for
seeking such access. Accordingly, we hold that Sega has failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright
claim. Because on the record before us the hardships do not tip
sharply (or at all) in Sega's favor, the preliminary injunction is-
sued in its favor must be dissolved, at least with respect to that
claim. 8
A. Intermediate copying9
In support of its ruling as to Accolade's first three arguments
above, the court pointed to the ruling in Walker v. University Books,
in which it held that the copyright act does not concern itself with
what stage of the process the infringement took place.'" Regarding
3. Id. at 1565.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1565-1566.
7. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1566.
8. Id. It seems apparent that the fact that Sega, along with Nintendo, dominates the
video game industry played a significant role in the Court's decision.
9. Id.
10. Id. Citing Walker v. University Books, 602 F.2d 859, 864, 202 U.S.P.Q.2D 793 (9th
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Accolade's citation of several cases which allowed some copying,
the court pointed out that in all of those cases it was the "degree of
similarity between the allegedly infringed work and the defendant's
final product" that provided the basis of the court's decision."' In
none of the cases was intermediate copying at issue. 12 The court
therefore concluded that the issue of whether "intermediate copying
of computer object code infringes the exclusive rights granted to the
copyright owner in section 106 of the Copyright Act is a question of
first impression." 13
B. The Idea/Expression Distinction4
Accolade argued that its copying of the object code did not
violate Section 102(b).I5 Accolade stated that because object code is
not humanly readable "disassembly of a commercially available
computer program into human-readable form should not be consid-
ered an infringement of the owner's copyright."' 6 In response, the
court pointed out that Accolade's argument ran contrary to settled
law 7 and that further, by making such an argument, Accolade was
stating essentially that object code should not be accorded the "full
range of copyright protection."' 8 The court, showing its familiarity
with computer technology, stated:
Nor does a refusal to recognize a per se right to disassemble ob-
ject code lead to an absurd result. The ideas and functional con-
cepts underlying many types of computer programs, including
word processing programs, spreadsheets, and video game dis-
plays, are readily discernible without the need for disassembly,
Cir. 1979), where the court stated: "[T]he fact that an allegedly infringing copy of a pro-
tected work may itself by only an inchoate representation of some final product to be mar-
keted commercially does not in itself negate the possibility of infringement." Id. at 864.
11. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1566. The only cases cited by Accolade which involved
similar copying of object code were Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2D 1241
(2d Cir. 1992); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2D 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989); and E.F.
Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F.Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985). Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at
1566.
12. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1566.
13. Id. at 1567.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1567.
18. Id. The Court went on to cite the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) which recommended that the "1980 Amendments to
the Copyright Act unambiguously extended copyright protection to computer programs,
Pub. L. 96-517, sec. 10, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. Sections 101, 117); see
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report I
(1979)[CONTU Report]." Id.
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because the operation of such programs is visible on the com-
puter screen. The need to disassemble object code arises, if at all,
only in connection with operations systems, system interface pro-
cedures, and other programs that are not visible to the user when
operating - and then only when no alternative means of gaining
an understanding of those ideas and functional concepts exists.
In our view, consideration of the unique nature of computer ob-
ject code thus is more appropriate as part of the case-by-case,
equitable "fair use" analysis authorized by section 107 of the
Act. 19
C. Section 11720
In response to Accolade's argument that the provision of Sec-
tion 117 which allows for the copying of computer programs for the
purpose of utilizing those computer programs2 authorized such
copying of Sega's object code, the court stated that Accolade's use
of Sega's object code went far beyond that which was contemplated
by section 117.22
D. Fair Use 23
Accolade finally succeeded with its fourth argument regarding
fair use. Accolade argued that its copying of the object code was a
"necessary step in the examination of the unprotected ideas and
functional concepts embodied in the code... and therefore was a
"fair use that is privileged by section 107 of the Act."'25 The court
agreed, stating:
Where there is good reason for studying or examining the unpro-
tected aspects of a copyrighted computer program, disassembly
for purposes of such study or examination is a fair use.26
The court rejected Sega's argument that use of the fair use de-
fense in cases involving disassembly of object code is precluded by
section 117 of the Act stating:
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1568.
21. Id.
22. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1568, citing the CONTU Report at 13 which stated
"[b]ecause the placement of any copyrighted work into a computer is the preparation of a
copy [since the program is loaded into the computer's memory], the law should provide that
persons in rightful possession of copies of programs be able to use them freely without fear of
exposure to copyright liability." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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That argument verges on the frivolous. Each of the exclusive
rights created by section 106 of the Copyright Act is expressly
made subject to all of the limitations contained in sections 107
through 120. 17 U.S.C. Section 106. Nothing in the language or
the legislative history of section 117, or in the CONTU Report,
suggests that section 117 was intended to preclude the assertion
of a fair use defense with respect to uses of computer programs
[that] are not covered by section 117, nor has section 107 been
amended to exclude computer programs from its ambit. 27
The court went on to say that in fact section 117 covered those uses
that were "lawful per se '" 2s and that section 107 was enacted for the
purpose of establishing "a defense to an otherwise valid claim of
copyright infringement. ' 29  The court concluded that because
"Congress has not chosen to provide a per se exemption to section
106 for disassembly does not mean that particular instances of dis-
assembly may not constitute fair use.",30
Regarding Sega's second argument that the legislative history
of Section 906 of the Semiconductor Chip Protector Act of 1984
indicated that Congress did not intend disassembly to be a fair
use,3 1 the court pointed out Congress's intent in passing Section 906
of the SCPA was to provide particular protection to semiconductor
chips because their uniquely "utilitarian" nature32 might exempt
them from protection under the Copyright Act.33 The court ob-
serves that the SCPA does not say anything about the lawfulness of
disassembly.34
The court cited section 107's factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether a particular use is a fair one:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
27. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1568.
28. Id., citing 17 U.S.C. Section 117.
29. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1568.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Court noted that "Section 906 of the SCPA authorizes the copying of a
'mask work' on a silicon ship in the course of reverse engineering the chip. 17 U.S.C. Section
906." Id.
32. Id. at 1569.
33. Id.
34. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1569.
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of the copyrighted work. 5
With regard to the district court's treatment of these factors and its
application of the factors to this case, the court pointed out:
In determining that Accolade's disassembly of Sega's object code
did not constitute a fair use, the district court treated the first
and fourth statutory factors as dispositive, and ignored the sec-
ond factor entirely. Given the nature and characteristics of Ac-
colade's direct use of the copied works, the ultimate use to which
Accolade put the functional information it obtained, and the na-
ture of the market for home video entertainment systems, we
conclude that neither the first nor the fourth factor weighs in
Sega's favor. In fact, we conclude that both factors support Ac-
colade's fair use defense, as does the second factor, a factor
which is important to the resolution of cases such as the one
before US. 3 6
Regarding the first factor, the court pointed out that the pre-
sumption against fair use when a commercial purpose is involved
can be rebutted by examining the characteristic of the particular
use. 7 The court stated that because Accolade copied the object
code only to reveal the uncopyrighted ideas and functional elements
of the program, the commercial nature of the copying was only "in-
direct or derivative."' 38 Furthermore, the court stated:
...we are free to consider the public benefit resulting from a
particular use notwithstanding the fact that the alleged infringer
may gain commercially. . . .[i]n the case before us Accolade's
identification of the functional requirements for Genesis compat-
ibility has led to an increase in the number independently
designed video game programs offered for use with the Genesis
console. It is precisely that growth in creative expression, based
on the dissemination of other creative works and the unprotected
ideas contained in those works, that the Copyright Act was in-
tended to promote.39
Regarding the second statutory factor the court noted that not
all forms of expression are entitled to the same protection under the
Copyright Act:
The protection established by the Copyright Act for original
works of authorship does not extend to the ideas underlying a
35. Id. Citing 17 U.S.C. § 107.
36. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1569.
37. Id., citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th
Cir. 1986).
38. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1569.
39. Id. at 1570.
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work or to the functional or factual aspects of the work. 17
U.S.C. section 102(b). To the extent that a work is functional or
factual it may be copied, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-04
(1879), as may those expressive elements of the work that "must
necessarily be used as incident to" expression of the underlying
ideas, functional concepts or facts, id. at 104.... Works that are
merely compilations of fact are copyrightable, but the copyright
in such a work is "thin." Feist Publications, 111 S. Ct. at 1289. 40
The court pointed out that although computer programs may
contain some creative elements, they are essentially "utilitarian arti-
cles' 41 and that because of this "hybrid nature of computer pro-
grams"'4 2 there has developed no established standard for separating
out protected and unprotected elements.43
The court rejects Sega's argument that the record does not es-
tablish that disassembly was the only means by which Accolade
could gain access to the functional aspects of Sega's program and
notes that the district court committed "clear error" in that the rec-
ord clearly establishes that humans cannot read object code and
that although it is possible to disassemble object code by hand in-
stead of through the use of a "decompiler" it is clearly necessary to
make a written or electronic copy of the object code in order to
translate it into human readable form.' Furthermore, with respect
to the district court's finding that Accolade could have utilized a
process known as "peeling" to avoid copyright infringement as au-
thorized by 17 U.S.C. section 906, the court stated this too was er-
ror because peeling reveals only a "physical diagram" of the object
code and does not eliminate the necessity of translating the object
code into source code.45
The court concluded as to the second factor that "because
Sega's video game programs contain unprotected aspects that can-
not be examined without copying, we afford them a lower degree of
protection than more traditional literary works."46
As to the third factor, the court noted that because Accolade
copied Sega's programs in their entirety, this factor weighed against
40. Id. at 1571.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1571. The Court cites the Second Circuit's observation that
the attempts to deal with this issue could be characterized as attempting "'to fit the prover-
bial square peg in a round hole.' CAI, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1257."
44. Id. at 1572.
45. Id. The Court also rejected the District Court's contention that Accolade could
have avoided copyright infringement by programming a "clean room." Id.
46. Id. at 1573.
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Accolade. However, the court also stated that the copying of the
entire program "does not, however, preclude a finding of fair use
per se."47 The court concluded in fact that "where use is limited as
it was here, the [third] factor is of very little weight. Cf Wright v.
Warner Books Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 738 [20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1992] (2dCir. 1991). ' ' 48
As for the fourth statutory factor, the court pointed out that
while Accolade's use of Sega's program, if it became widespread,
may have an adverse effect on Sega, Accolade did not seek to usurp
Sega's games but created its own games which were now compatible
and could be used on Sega's Genesis console.49 Further, the court
pointed out that devotees of video games could reasonably be ex-
pected to purchase both Sega's games as well as Accolade's." As
to the fourth factor, the court therefore concluded:
In any event, an attempt to monopol[i]ze the market by making
it impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory
purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a
strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use
doctrine. Thus we conclude that the fourth statutory factor
weighs in Accolade's, not Sega's, favor notwithstanding the mi-
nor economic loss Sega may suffer.51
As to the interpretation of the four statutory factors, the court
concluded by stating that the first, second and fourth statutory fac-
tors weighed in favor of Accolade,52 and that only the third factor
weighed slightly in favor of Sega.5 3 Accordingly, as to the question
of whether the Accolade's use was fair the court concluded:
.. where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas
and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer
program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such
access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a
matter of law. Our conclusion does not, of course, insulate Ac-
47. Id., citing Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449-50; Hustler, 795 F.2d at 1155.
48. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1573.
49. Id. at 1570. The Court points to several cases which hold that a use would not be
considered fair if 'it would adversely effect the potential market for the copyrighted work.'
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 [220 U.S.P.Q. 665] (1984). Id.
50. Id. at 1571. The Court noted that video game buyers typically purchased more than
one video game and that "There is no basis for assuming that Accolade's 'Ishido' has signifi-
cantly affected the market for Sega's 'Altered Beast,' since a consumer might easily purchase
both; nor does it seem unlikely that a consumer particularly interested in sports might
purchase both Accolade's 'Mike Ditka Power Football', and Sega's 'Joe Montana Football',
particularly if the games are, as Accolade contends, not substantially similar." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1573.
53. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1573.
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colade from a claim of copyright infringement with respect to its
finished products. Sega has reserved the right to raise such a
claim, and it may do so on remand. 4
E. Trademark Issues55
Sega's trademark Security System (TMSS), initialization code
not only allows game programs to operate on Sega's Genesis III
console, but also generates an on-screen display of Sega's
trademark.5
6
Having gained access to Sega's Genesis console through the
initialization code, Accolade also, in using that code, triggered an
on-screen display of Sega's trademark. Both parties agreed that this
was an unauthorized and improper use of Sega's trademark.57 How-
ever, the Court wrestled with the question of whether Accolade was
the injured party because users of its games were lead to believe that
the games were manufactured by Sega, or whether Sega was the
injured party because its name was being used without its authori-
zation. Both Sega and Accolade claimed that the other was in vio-
lation of statutes due to the use of the on-screen display.58
Accolade claimed that Sega's use of the TMSS code to trigger the
on screen dispay was a "false designation of origin under Lanham
Act section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. section 1125(a)." 59 Sega, for its part,
claimed that Accolade's use of its trademark was a violation of
32(l)(a) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. sections
1114(1)(a), 1125(a), respectively.6'
The court concluded that because there was no other way to
gain access to the Genesis III console and because Accolade clearly
had no desire to appropriate Sega's trademark for its own use, it
was in fact Sega who would be held primarily responsible for any
resultant confusion created by the on-screen display of its
trademark.
F. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit held that disassembly of computer object
code is fair use if such disassembly is the only way to gain access to
54. Id. at 1574.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1574.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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the functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer pro-
gram, and if there is a legitimate reason for this access. The court
further held that the confusion arising out of the on-screen display
of Sega's trademark, was in fact attributable to plaintiff.6' Despite
the Court's ruling that intermediate copying of computer code con-
stitutes infringement, it is possible to argue that it does not in fact
constitute copyright infringement if the intermediate copying is
done to create an original program which does not copy the pro-
tected expression of the copyrighted work. 2
61. Id. at 1577.
62. See eg., NEC v. Intel, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989). That case involved the
disassembly of microcode. The Court ruled that studying code that is not copied does not
infringe, nor does copying that is "deleted or so disguised as to be unrecognizable."
[Vol. 9
